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Abstract² Multi SIM User Equipment (UE) can have more 
than one physical slot for Universal Integrated Circuit Card 
(UICC). The eUICC is an embedded version of the UICC, which 
cannot be physically removed from the communication device. 
Currently, 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) is working 
on developing Authentication and Key Management for 
Applications (AKMA), with which user can bootstrap 
authentication towards application server from his mobile 
subscription. We consider the scenario that may become common 
in devices with Multi SIM and eUICC, in which one subscription 
is used for primary services such as voice and data, and another 
subscription is used for AKMA services. In this scenario, the
purpose is to use AKMA services simultaneously and without 
interrupting primary services. There are existing requirements for 
Multi SIM and eUICC, which restrain this scenario from being 
successful. The solution that we propose includes arrangements 
and adaptations, in order to provide secure and uninterrupted 
services of both primary and AKMA services.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dual SIM phones have two physical slots for inserting the 
Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC). To the consumer they 
offer the advantage of increased convenience and reduced costs 
by being able to access different mobile networks from a single 
smart phone based on, e.g., price or signal strength. In addition,
phones that can use more than two physical UICCs have been 
produced [1], [2]. Dual SIM phones have one or two 
transceivers. The variety in the number of transceivers and the 
way in which radio connection via a transceiver is multiplexed, 
creates different modes of Dual SIM devices. One of those
modes is Dual SIM Single Standby (DSSS), where the device 
has one transceiver through which it can have one radio 
connection. Another mode is Dual SIM Dual Standby (DSDS),
where the device has one transceiver, but two radio connections 
through that transceiver are possible by using time multiplexing 
techniques. Third mode is Dual SIM Dual Active (DSDA), 
where a device has two transceivers, and so can have two radio 
connections simultaneously [3], [4]. In case that more than two 
Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM)s exist in the smart 
phone, hybrid modes can appear [4].  
Standardization of Multi SIM devices has taken off in GSM 
Association (GSMA), European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI) and recently 3rd Generation Partnership Project 
(3GPP). The GSMA has produced requirements for Multi SIM 
devices [4]. The 3GPP services working group SA1 has 
completed a study of Multi SIM requirements and use cases [5];
it now has a work item on this topic [6], [7]. In addition, the study 
of Multi SIM devices has been proposed in 3GPP RAN group 
[3].
Another relatively recent development is the standardization 
of Embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (eUICC) in 
ETSI and GSMA. The eUICC is an embedded UICC in a 
communication device that can be managed remotely without 
physical removal or replacement of the UICC [8]. Remote SIM 
Provisioning (RSP) is combination of downloading, installing, 
enabling, disabling, switching, and deleting of a Profile on an
eUICC [9] and the Profile in the eUICC is a combination of all 
data related to the subscription, which is necessary for providing 
services. According to GSMA, the content and structure for 
interoperable Profiles stored on eUICCs are similar to those 
installed on traditional SIMs [10]. The use case envisioned for 
eUICC include both Machine-to-Machine (M2M) [11] and 
consumer devices [12].
We expect that Multi SIM phones in the future will be based 
on the eUICC technology, instead of having several physical 
UICCs [13].
Currently, 3GPP is studying Authentication and Key 
Management for Applications (AKMA) service that is being 
developed for 5G authentication architecture [14]. It is 
essentially a key distribution service, where the authentication 
can be bootstrapped towards application server from mobile 
subscription of the user. The standardization of AKMA is still in 
early stages, and it is not yet clear if the resulting standard will 
support interoperability of AKMA between operators. Even if it 
would, interoperability of AKMA service between operators will 
take time to emerge. 
In this paper, we are concerned with a situation where a user 
has a Multi SIM phone with one USIM used for voice and data 
service and another USIM for AKMA service. For example, 
there is a user, who has a main subscription for voice and data 
with one Mobile Network Operator (MNO), but he/she wants to 
use a service that is accessible via AKMA to subscribers of 
another MNO. For instance, the user may have a connected car 
where some functions of the car can be controlled via an 
application on a smart phone. The user needs to utilize AKMA 
in order to start using the application. While doing these, the user 
may need to use voice services on main subscription. In this 
situation, it is required that both voice (provided by one 
subscription) and AKMA service (provided by another 
subscription) can be used at the same time.
Double-transceiver phones are suitable for our scenario, if 
there are only two USIMs and one of these USIMs is used for 
AKMA. If there is a need for one more USIM for AKMA, then 
also double transceivers are not enough. 
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We expect that most Multi SIM phones will have a single 
transceiver, because an additional transceiver in double-
transceiver phone makes the phone more expensive. 
A single-transceiver, Dual SIM phone having only dual 
passive mode is not useful for our scenario, because with such 
phone USIM1-AKMA and USIM2-voice cannot be used 
simultaneously. A dual standby mode phone may be more 
suitable for our scenario. However, there may be a problem in 
this mode, if the phone does not retain session information when 
the USIM-AKMA is in the standby state. 
We observe that the requirements of eUICC architecture 
include the following: ³the behavior of the eUICC with an 
Enabled Profile shall be equivalent to the UICC´, and ³at a 
maximum, only one Profile shall be enabled at any point in time´ 
[9]. Because of these requirements, we can say that the phone 
with eUICC acts like a dual-passive device. Thus, our scenario 
will not work with a phone having eUICC. 
We propose a solution to this problem by combining several 
solutions for AKMA proposed in the 3GPP technical report [14] 
and adapting them to eUICC and Multi SIM architectures. By 
this configuration, we aim to perform AKMA authentication in 
a secure way without interrupting services from primary 
subscription. 
II. BACKGROUND  
This section briefly explains the technical details that are 
needed for this paper. We start with the definitions of 
fundamental elements, which are important for the rest of the 
paper. Then, we provide technical details and explanations of 
Multi SIM, eUICC, and AKMA. Our argument is based on 
these elements. 
A. Definitions 
SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) is the physical entity that 
contains keys and ID that are required for authenticating the 
user to a mobile network. 
UICC (Universal Integrated Circuit Card) is the physical 
entity that contains the SIM/USIM application. 
UE (User Equipment) is the user's mobile device in 3G, LTE 
and 5G cellular networks. For the purpose of this paper, the UE 
can be thought of as having two main parts: (i) the UICC, and 
(ii) the Mobile Equipment (ME) part that includes the rest of the 
UE. 
USIM (Universal Subscriber Identity Module) is an 
application that runs on the UICC and provides authentication 
functions similar to those provided by the SIM in pre-3G 
systems. 
eUICC (Embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card) is an 
embedded UICC in a communication device. The eUICC can 
be managed without physical removal or replacement of the 
UICC. The eUICC contains USIM application(s), similarly as 
UICC does. 
Profile is a specific SIM/USIM application contained within 
an eUICC. 
B. Multi SIM 
The current technology allows simultaneous access of more 
than two USIMs from a single device to the mobile network 
services [15]. Changing between subscriptions happens easier 
than with single SIM devices, in the way that for Multi SIM 
devices, several UICCs can be stored in the device 
simultaneously and changing between subscriptions would not 
require changing UICCs physically. This property is very 
helpful for customers who would like to always choose the 
cheapest option for every different service or who are in some 
locations with unstable coverage. The latter case can be eased 
by connecting to two (or more) networks [16].  
When two UICCs are allowed in mobile devices, these are 
called Dual SIM devices. If two or more UICCs are allowed in 
mobile devices, then these are called Multi SIM devices [4]. 
One of the market studies reveals that one out of three smart 
phones sold globally is a Dual SIM Dual Standby (DSDS) 
device [17]. The DSDS UE, explained below, seems to be 
favored by both customers and manufacturers. 
In the specification document of GSMA [4] and working 
group meetings of 3GPP [3], the different operation modes of 
Multi SIM devices are explained. These specifications and 
studies consider mostly the Dual SIM cases, but 
implementations with more than two USIMs are not excluded. 
Fig. 1 displays state combinations for different modes of Dual 
SIM, which we explain below; 
1) Dual SIM Single Standby (DSSS), also can be named as 
Passive Dual SIM [4], has two UICC slots, but it has only one 
transceiver, which can provide only one logical connection to 
one network at a time. Therefore, only one of the USIMs can be 
chosen and be active. 
2) Dual SIM Dual Standby (DSDS) devices share one 
transceiver, similarly to the DSSS devices. However, by using 
time multiplexing two radio connections can be provided when 
the both USIMs are in idle mode. When one of the USIMs is 
activated, the other USIM loses the connection, but its 
registration for the network is maintained. 
3) Dual SIM Dual Active (DSDA) devices contain two 
transceivers. Therefore, both USIMs can be active both in idle and 
connected modes; they act independently with respect to the other 
USIMs activity. 
Fig. 1. State combinations in different Dual SIM modes 
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Besides Dual SIM cases, Multi SIM cases are also possible 
in mobile devices.  
C. eUICC 
Embedded UICC (eUICC) stores Profiles and allows remote 
management of the Profile over-the-air. There can be zero or 
more Profiles in the eUICC [9]; the maximum number Profiles 
depends on the capacity of eUICC [10]. A schematic illustration 
of eUICC Architecture is shown in Fig. 2. As shown in the 
figure, only enabled profile has connection with MNO core 
network. The gray Profile slots indicate empty slots for Profiles 
which can be downloaded in the future. Profile Installer and 
Profile Manager are elements in eUICC that are in contact with 
elements of MNO. These elements are responsible for 
downloading, storing, enabling, disabling, deleting, and           
updating of Profiles in the eUICC [10]. 
According to one eUICC requirement, eUICC shall provide 
isolation of data and applications between Profiles [8]. Content 
of eUICC cannot be reached and applications in eUICC cannot 
be triggered, unless the Profile is active [12]. 
Profiles stored in the eUICC have two different statuses: 
enabled and disabled. The eUICC with enabled Profile is 
expected to behave like a regular UICC [12] and it provides 
connection with the mobile network. On the other hand, when 
the Profile is disabled it stays installed in eUICC, but 
applications in the Profile cannot be selected and the files in the 
Profile cannot be reached by the device or by any application 
on eUICC [8].  
One of the eUICC requirements of GSMA, EUICC5, states 
that at the maximum, only one Profile shall be enabled at any 
point in time [9]. So, if the user enables Profile B, while Profile 
A was active, Profile A becomes disabled immediately before 
Profile B can be active.  
The specifications do not explain reasons of the restriction 
for having at most one active profile. One reason for this 
requirement could be that the behavior of eUICC was wanted to 
mimic the traditional setting of a UE with one slot for a 
removable UICC, as closely as possible. Now changing of 
active profile corresponds to change of physical UICC in the 
traditional UE. 
In Fig. 3, we show flow of messages related to eUICC, based 
on GSMA publications [9], [10], [18]. The messages, which are 
presented in the figure, are sent during the communication 
between UE and different networks, while user changes Profiles 
Fig. 2. eUICC architecture; adapted from [8] 
Fig. 3. Flow of messages related to eUICC 
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in eUICC. The numbers on Fig. 3 correspond with the numbers 
below. Network A and Network B denote the networks, 
associated with Profile A and Profile B, respectively. 
In the beginning of Fig. 3, we assume that Profile A has been 
downloaded to eUICC recently and it is the only Profile on 
eUICC. 
1) User wants to enable Profile A. 
2) Profile A is enabled in eUICC. 
3) The eUICC sends request to Radio Modem for triggering 
Network A to establish connection.  
4) Connection is established between UE and Network A. 
5) After the connection is established, Authentication and 
Key Agreement (AKA) procedure is initiated between Profile 
A and Network A. If the AKA is successfully completed, then 
User can start using services with Profile A. 
Note: After the Step (5), User continues using Profile A. In 
this stage, many other Profiles might have been downloaded to 
the device. This does not have effect on the services of Profile 
A, until one of those Profiles is enabled. 
6) User wants to enable another Profile, Profile B. 
7) The eUICC disables Profile A, and then enables Profile 
B.  
8) The eUICC requests Radio Modem to drop the 
connection between Profile A and Network A, and triggers 
connection to Network B. 
9) Radio Modem informs Network A that Profile A left the 
network. 
10) After leaving Network A, Radio Modem establishes 
connection with Network B. 
11) After the connection is established, AKA procedure is 
initiated between Profile B in the eUICC and Network B.  If the 
AKA procedure is successfully completed, then User can start 
using services with Profile B. 
With every Profile, which is enabled while another Profile 
is active, steps 6-11 of Fig. 3 will be repeated. 
D. AKMA 
Since the 3GPP authentication infrastructure and 3GPP 
AKA procedure are considered as valuable assets for 3GPP 
operators, 3GPP has standardized Generic Bootstrapping 
Architecture (GBA). It is a mobile network service for 
bootstrapping of application security based on AKA procedure 
in Evolved Packet System / Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System (EPS/UMTS) [19]. In essence, 
GBA is a key distribution service for applications, where the 
session key between UE and application server is bootstrapped 
from AKA.   
3GPP is currently studying a similar service, called 
Authentication and Key Management for Applications 
(AKMA), for 5G system [14]. The AKMA architecture includes 
two new network functions. These functions are AKMA 
Authentication Function (AAuF) and AKMA Application 
Function (AApF). AKMA Application Function uses the 
authentication service of AAuF and gets the key for the secure 
channel. AKMA authentication function is responsible for 
authenticating UE and managing the key material related to UE.  
The AKMA study of 3GPP, in TR 33.835 [14], contains 
several potential solutions for various important problems. 
Next, three of these proposed solutions for AKMA are 
explained. These solutions are referred by the numbers from 
[14] while constructing our proposal. Following [14], the term 
³AKMA framework´ denotes the AKMA module in the mobile 
equipment ± the part of the UE that includes the application 
processor and the radio modem but does not include the UICC. 
1) AKMA Solution 7: ³UE implementation scheme ± AKMA 
framework and application on modem´.  
In this solution, AKMA framework and the applications are 
implemented on modem. 3GPP AKA runs on UICC. The 
Cipher Key and the Integrity Key (CK and IK), which are 
obtained from 3GPP AKA, are given to AKMA framework to 
be used in deriving session key for AKMA. The AKMA 
framework requests these keys via Application Protocol Data 
Units (APDU) messages. Along with these keys, some other 
parameters including identifiers can be exchanged between 
AKMA framework and UICC. Fig. 4 presents the relation of the 
AKMA framework and the UICC. 
2) AKMA Solution 13: ³AKMA authentication via the 
control plane´.  
The purpose of this solution is to perform independent 
AKMA authentication, without repeating primary 
authentication, to obtain KAKMA, which is the AKMA-specific 
key that is derived based on the AKA procedure. In Fig. 5, the 
AKMA reference architecture is shown. 
When UE and AApF agree to have a secure communication, 
UE starts AKMA authentication with AAuF. In the end of 
authentication, both UE and AAuF have a key, KAKMA. Then, 
UE generates a new key, KAF, by using some parameters, 
including the identifier of AApF. The AAuF generates the KAF, 
when AApF requests the key information related to UE. Then, 
AAuF provides the KAF to AApF.  
3) AKMA Solution 15: ³,PSOLFLW%RRWVWUDSSLQJ´.  
The AKAF is AKMA Anchor Function, which can be same 
as Authentication Server Function (AUSF) or a separate entity. 
This solution is about refreshing the AKMA Anchor key, 
KAKMA, without repeating primary authentication in UE and 
AKAF. The solution offers two options for the derivation of 
KAKMA, one is as a sibling and other is as a child key in relation 
Fig. 4. AKMA framework and UICC; adapted from [2] 
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to KAUSF. In case of AKMA key refreshing, sibling keys require 
primary authentication in order to get new KAKMA. On the other 
hand, if KAKMA is derived from KAUSF, a freshness parameter, 
such as a sequence number that is held by AKAF/AUSF, can be 
included during the derivation. This refresh procedure can be 
used for both options of primary authentication in 5G system, 
EAP-AKA' and 5G AKA. When it is needed to refresh the 
KAKMA, AKAF obtains freshness parameter from AUSF and 
sends it to UE. The visualized version of the key hierarchy for 
deriving KAKMA as a child key is presented in Fig. 6. 
   The UE sends the request for AKMA authentication to 
Core Access and Management Function/Security Anchor 
Function (AMF/SEAF) over Non-Access Stratum (NAS) and 
they recognize the request for the AKMA authentication and 
forward the request to the correct home network entity, AAuF. 
Then, AAuF gets AV from Unified Data Management (UDM) 
and learns the authentication method. Between AAuF and UE, 
either 5G AKA or EAP-AKA' is performed for AKMA 
purposes. If the authentication ends successfully, AAuF and UE 
have fresh KAKMA. 
III. MULTI SIM AND EUICC STANDARDIZATION 
The GSMA has technical specification for Multi SIM, the 
recent version was published in December 2018 [4]. GSMA and 
ETSI have technical specifications about eUICC. The technical 
specification from ETSI is TS 103 383 [8] and the latest version 
was published in July 2018. GSMA has been working on 
eUICC, while developing RSP. Different technical 
specifications were published for Machine-to-Machine devices 
and consumer devices, in terms of RSP technologies. These 
papers, SGP.01 [18] and SGP.02 [11], are about RSP 
architecture for eUICC in Machine-to-Machine devices. 
SGP.21 [9] is about RSP architecture and SGP.22 [12] is 
technical specification about RSP in consumer devices with 
eUICC.   
Multi SIM has been discussed in working groups of 3GPP. 
According to the Work Item Description with number SP-
190309, ³SA1 WG has started the study for use cases, 
concluded and identified consolidate potential service 
requirements in TR 22.834, which is ready for sending SA 
Plenary¶s approval´ [6]. With Stage 1 technical specifications 
and requirements, it will be easier to improve and contribute to 
Multi SIM devices for Evolved Packet System (EPS) and 5G. 
Short after the above claim in SP-190309, 3GPP published the 
technical report about Multi SIM devices [5]. In this technical 
report and other 3GPP documents, Multi SIM is referred as 
Multi USIM and abbreviation is used as MUSIM. Uses cases 
related to Multi USIM Devices are published in TR 22.834 [5]. 
IV. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Implementing more than one USIM per mobile device gives 
users opportunities for preferring different MNOs for different 
services.  
If the user prefers a particular MNO for his/her voice and 
data services (primary subscription), but another MNO offers a 
more attractive AKMA service, then the user can decide to put 
an extra USIM for AKMA to a Multi SIM device or download 
an extra Profile to eUICC. Therefore, we are interested in 
scenarios for Multi SIM device usage, where USIM1 of one 
MNO is used, e.g., for voice, data, and USIM2 of another MNO 
is used for AKMA. With this scenario, the purpose is executing 
AKMA with USIM2 without interrupting the services on 
USIM1. Please note that this scenario can be extended to 
multiple USIMs from different MNOs used for AKMA. If many 
services start using AKMA, then there might be multiple MNO 
requirements for user. Each service might have agreements with 
different MNOs. If the user wants to use these services, he/she 
should have subscriptions from related MNOs. Then, if the user 
starts using several services one after another, changing 
between USIMs would be too time consuming and inefficient. 
When the different modes of Dual SIM are considered, 
DSSS will not support the scenario. Two USIMs cannot be 
active at the same time. Therefore, it is not possible to use 
AKMA services with USIM2 without interrupting the services 
with USIM1. The other mode, DSDS, could support the 
scenario with certain provisions. When USIM1 is in idle mode, 
USIM2 can perform AKMA. However, when USIM1 is active, 
Fig. 5. AKMA reference architecture; adapted from [2] 
Fig. 6. Key Hierarchy for KAKMA; adapted from [2] 
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the radio connection of USIM2 is lost. Another mode is DSDA 
and this mode would support the scenario. The problem of this 
mode is that DSDA mode needs two transceivers (radio 
modems) in the mobile equipment, which increases the cost of 
device. 
It is possible that Multi SIM phones will be based on the 
eUICC technology, rather than on many physical UICCs, in the 
future. In case of the scenario considered in this paper, the 
eUICC would not support it. Unless a Profile is enabled, the 
eUICC acts like this Profile does not exist. However, if this 
Profile is enabled, the active primary Profile is disabled 
automatically, and all the services are interrupted [8]. Even 
though AKMA does not require radio connection, it does not 
function efficiently with the scenario. 
In addition to mobile services, such as data, voice, Short 
Message Service (SMS), and Multimedia Messaging Service 
(MMS), AKMA authentication shall be considered as one of the 
mobile services. Users should have eligibility to choose the 
operator for completing AKMA authentication. However, 
AKMA authentication should not interrupt the connection of 
other active services. 
It could be noted that, independently of AKMA, it would 
make sense to provide a Multi SIM functionality in a device 
having just one eUICC (that is, a device without a physical 
UICC).  
V. SOLUTION 
Assume that a smartphone has eUICC with two profiles or 
it is Multi SIM phone with two USIMs. Profile A (USIM A) is 
for primary use, such as data connection, phone calls, etc. 
Profile B (USIM B) is for AKMA authentication for a service, 
such as an application or an online platform. According to the 
eUICC architecture specification, Profile A needs to be disabled 
in order to AKMA authentication to be completed with Profile 
B [9]. Disabling Profile A means that the data connection would 
be lost, and phone calls would be interrupted.  
Our purpose is to complete AKMA authentication for 
Profile B without interrupting the connection of Profile A. 
In the rest of the section, possible AKMA solutions for 
eUICC and different operation modes of Multi SIM are 
explained. 
A. Case of eUICC 
In the beginning of the solution for eUICC case, we assume 
that the primary profile, Profile A, is enabled. User enables 
Profile B, when he/she is not actively using Profile A. This 
process can be done early in the morning or can be triggered 
automatically during nighttime. The frequency of repeating the 
following procedure depends on the lifetime of the key. This 
procedure is summarized in Fig. 7 and numbers on the figure 
correspond to those below. Network A and Network B denote the 
networks associated with Profile A and Profile B, respectively. 
Fig. 7. Flow of relevant messages for solution case of eUICC 
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1) User wants to enable Profile B to perform AKMA 
authentication and to store its product, KAKMA.  
2) When the User gives the command for enabling Profile B, 
the Profile A becomes disabled immediately [8]. After the Profile 
A is disabled, then Profile B becomes enabled. 
3) In order to continue, an IP connection, such as cellular 
connection of Profile B, e.g. the steps 8 to 11 from Fig. 3 with 
additional steps to establish IP connection from UE to AAuF in 
network B, or WiFi connection, should be established.  
4) When the Profile B is enabled and IP connection is 
established, AKMA authentication between Profile B and 
Network B takes place through AKMA framework. 
5) If the authentication is successful, a key, KAUSF, is derived 
as explained in the Solution 4 of 3GPP TR 33.835 [14]. Then, 
KAKMA is derived from KAUSF, as a child key, which is also 
explained in AKMA Solution 15. The key, KAKMA, is derived and 
stored in Network B (more specifically in AAuF) on the network 
side. On the UE side, KAKMA, is derived in eUICC and stored in 
AKMA framework, as explained in AKMA Solution 7. 
Application-specific session keys will be derived in AKMA 
framework from KAKMA.  
6) After the KAKMA (B) is stored in AKMA framework, User 
wants to enable Profile A.  
7) When the User gives the command for enabling Profile A, 
the Profile B becomes disabled immediately.   
8) After the Profile B is disabled, the information related to 
Profile B is kept in AKMA framework. 
9) After the Profile switch, eUICC requests from radio 
modem to drop the connection with Network B and trigger the 
connection with Network A. In case there is no cellular 
connection to Network B, e.g., if in step (3), the IP connection is 
established over WiFi when the device is on flight mode, the 
radio modem does not need to do anything. 
10)  Connection between the radio modem and Network A is 
established.  
11) After the connection is established, AKA is initiated 
between Profile A and Network A via the radio modem. If Profile 
A is also participating in AKMA authentication with some other 
services, then Profile A can start AKMA authentication in this 
step. As long as the device of the Profile B has internet 
connection, via data connection of Profile A or WiFi, User can 
start using the service, as explained in AKMA Solution 13.  
The sequence of events, explained above and in Fig. 7, 
occurs, e.g., when user wants to connect to an application for the 
first time or when the validity time of KAKMA is expired. The 
sequence of events, explained below and in Fig. 8, occurs e.g. 
when UE has valid KAKMA and wants to reconnect to the 
application server. Fig. 8 is explained below. 
1) User wants to use the Service, namely APP1.  
2) UE requests AKMA framework to connect to the 
Application Server of APP1 (AApF). 
3) The AKMA framework derives a session key KAF with 
identifier of AApF and some other parameters.  
4) Then, with KAF, AKMA framework generates a 
Temporary Identifier for Profile B (TID(B)).  
5) AKMA framework sends request to AApF with the 
TID(B). 
6) After AApF receives the request, it sends the request 
along with its identifier to AAuF.  
Fig. 8. Flow of relevant messages continues from Fig. 7 
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7) With the TID(B) and identifier of AApF, AAuF 
recognizes the request is sent by Profile B. So, AAuF sends the 
KAF of Profile B and the corresponding validity time to AApF.  
8) AApF sends the Response back to UE. If the response is 
positive, then User can start using the service. 
The UE and AApF can use the session key KAF during the 
validity time. After the validity time expires or UE sends request 
by using another key, the AApF sends a request to AAuF for the 
recent key. 
A profile in eUICC can be enabled, disabled, and deleted. In 
case of the solution offered above, each status of profile should 
have an effect on AKMA framework. The relation between 
profile status change and the action in AKMA framework is 
described below and summarized in Table I. 
x When the profile is enabled, AKMA authentication starts 
immediately and the key, KAKMA, for AKMA framework is 
renewed. Key in the network is also renewed. 
x When the profile is disabled, AKMA framework keeps 
the key, KAKMA. Network would not know that the profile is 
disabled, so network keeps the key. 
x When the profile is deleted from eUICC, the AKMA 
framework also deletes the information related to that profile. 
Network would be aware that the profile is deleted from the 
eUICC. Therefore, network would know that key is not valid 
anymore. 
TABLE I.  RELATION BETWEEN PROFILE STATUS CHANGE AND THE ACTION IN 
AKMA FRAMEWORK 
Profile Status Action in AKMA Framework 
Enabled AKMA Authentication starts and the key, KAKMA, 
in AKMA framework is renewed 
Disabled AKMA framework keeps the key, KAKMA 
Deleted AKMA framework deletes all the information 
related to the profile. 
 
The AKMA framework would keep KAKMA and related 
temporary identifiers along with the KAF. The AKMA framework 
may keep several keys for several profiles. For example, there 
can be Profile C that is also used for AKMA purposes. Any 
Profile, which is stored in eUICC, would be able to participate in 
AKMA. In this situation, AKMA framework should keep the 
keys of different Profiles apart and safe. AKMA framework 
would return AKMA registration information according to the 
request related to the Profile. If the Profile A is participating in 
the AKMA, request message, which is sent to AKMA 
framework, should include an indicator about Profile A. User 
should be able to choose which Profile to use for AKMA. 
B. Multi SIM Case 
In this section, we outline how our solution works for Multi 
SIM devices. As discussed earlier, there are different types of 
Multi SIM devices. Next, we will explain our solution for each 
type. 
1) DSSS: DSSS can follow similar steps as suggested for 
eUICC in Section V.A. 
2) DSDS: In the case of DSDS, AKMA authentication can 
be completed with less problems compared to the solution for 
eUICC. For DSDS, if one USIM, or primary USIM, is activated, 
registration of the other USIM is not lost [4]. Therefore, KAUSF 
of secondary USIM from the bootstrapping is not lost every 
time primary USIM is activated. In this case, AKMA 
framework in AKMA Solution 7 is not a necessity for DSDS 
mode. Also, KAKMA can be derived from KAUSF freshly, any time 
AKMA authentication is needed, as explained in AKMA 
Solution 15. This solution can be applied for DSDS mode as 
well, because fresh key for each authentication is always 
preferred from security point of view, and less primary 
authentication is less workload for the network. With AKMA 
Solution 13, AKMA authentication can be done through an IP 
connection of the device, which can be either data connection 
of primary USIM or a WiFi connection. 
3) DSDA: With DSDA, there is no need for special 
arrangement. AKMA authentication can be done as if the phone 
has single USIM. Since the both USIMs can be active 
simultaneously, bootstrapping can be initiated any time 
necessary. If USIM for AKMA does not have data connection, 
then AKMA authentication can be completed via IP connection 
of the device, as explained in AKMA Solution 13. For 
simplicity, requirements for DSDA can be adopted from DSDS. 
VI. THREATS 
One possible threat is from outside. In general, mobile device 
is more vulnerable than UICC. Therefore, the device could get 
compromised, while UICC is not. This way, hacker can get the 
keys and identifiers for a specific service and start using that 
service, masquerading as the victim. Another outsider threat 
might be in application side. A malicious application client 
could try to reach all the keys that exist in device. In addition, 
network might try to use UICC for reaching to the AKMA keys 
of other networks, which are stored in AKMA framework. 
Another possible threat is from inside. The owner of the 
phone might prefer to store the keys separately, while changing 
UICCs. This way, the user can get access to the application 
without having UICC present.  
Overall, those are valid threats that need to be mitigated. 
However, AKMA needs to be protected against those threats 
independently from our proposed solution. 
Lifetime of the keys are determined by the service providers. 
In order to provide secure service, lifetime of the keys should 
be kept limited and refreshed regularly. However, this authority 
of the service provider can be spoiled by a malicious service 
provider. 
The main threat that is specific to our solution is the 
following. In our solution, AKMA framework keeps KAKMA 
after the Profile is disabled in eUICC. This means that the 
potential hacker could get hold of the KAKMA key long after UE 
has intended to stop using it. This threat corresponds to a threat 
in the physical UICC case where a user removes the UICC from 
the device and gives the device to somebody else, e.g. sells the 
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device further. Now it is obviously a bad idea to leave derived 
keys in the device while the UICC has already been taken out.  
Our solution provides mitigation against the threat by 
deleting KAKMA from AKMA framework, when the 
corresponding Profile is deleted from eUICC. (See Section 
V.A.) It is the deletion of the Profile, rather than disabling that 
should happen when the device is given to hands of potentially 
untrustworthy party. There is a residual risk involved, e.g., in 
case where several people share the same device, and each have 
their own profile in the eUICC. In this case, it is natural to 
disable, rather than delete, the profile when control of the device 
is given to somebody else. However, it should be noted that in 
this type of setting the users of the same device typically have 
some level of trust between them.  
The deletion of a Profile is an operation that involves the 
MNO [10]. Therefore, the MNO could also help in mitigating 
the threat by informing AApF about deletion of a Profile, so that 
AApF could delete the keys related to that Profile. 
VII. DISCUSSION ABOUT EUICC AND MULTI SIM 
The proposals for standardizing Multi SIM are given to 
3GPP [3], [6], and [7]. Even though proposals for RAN group 
are not accepted by 3GPP yet, but SA1 group has started 
working on Multi SIM and published technical report TR 
22.834 recently [5]. The studies will be completed and Multi 
SIM standardization will be available. 
In markets, DSDS UEs are available. These devices can 
support Voice over LTE (VoLTE) and Mobile Broadcast and 
Multicast (MBMS) services. Moreover, with the development 
of 5G, Radio Access Technologies (RAT) such as Narrow Band 
Internet of Things (NB-IoT) and 5G New Radio (NR) are 
introduced and improved. All these improvements will 
probably lead Multi SIM devices to be preferred more than 
single SIM devices in the future [17]. Some studies about Multi 
SIM and Dual SIM devices have been published [16], [17]. 
Furthermore, there are published analyses of eUICC [13], [20]. 
It is stated in the requirement with code EUICC4 [9] that 
Profiles in eUICC should behave like USIM in UICC. If eUICC 
is compared to Multi SIM cases, it can be seen that eUICC is 
behaving like DSSS. Currently, DSDS or DSDA devices are 
used commonly. Therefore, enhancements should be applied to 
specifications of eUICC, so that eUICC can adapt at least 
properties of DSDS or DSDA. It would be even better if eUICC 
specifications would also adapt to other Multi SIM scenarios 
than Dual SIM. 
If eUICC cannot be adapted to DSDS or DSDA, it can still 
be combined with Multi SIM. For example, if the device has 
Dual SIM property, then it must have two UICCs. If one or both 
UICCs are turned into eUICC, then there can be many 
combinations for using different Profiles. This way, eUICC can 
mimic DSDS or DSDA. In case more than two UICCs are 
implemented in the device, eUICC could replace one of these, 
or even several eUICCs could be implemented in the same 
device. 
According to the assessment of eUICC by Meyer et al. [13], 
eUICC is presumably the next generation SIM that can be used 
in all devices such as Internet of Things (IoT) and smart phones. 
Moreover, eUICC is currently included in many devices and is 
supported by various MNOs all over the world [21]. Therefore, 
eUICC should be taken into consideration by 3GPP along with 
Multi SIM concept and specifications should be developed 
accordingly.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we deal with Authentication and Key 
Management for Applications (AKMA), which has been 
developed in 3GPP for single SIM devices. We consider the use 
cases of AKMA with Multi SIM devices and devices with 
eUICC. We paid attention to the scenario in which there are two 
Profiles in an eUICC (similarly two SIMs in Multi SIM devices) 
and one Profile is used for primary usage, such as voice and 
data, where the other Profile is used for AKMA services. 
Moreover, the scenario can be extended to a case with several 
Profiles/SIMs dedicated for AKMA. Regarding the 
specifications of eUICC and Multi SIM devices, it is not 
possible to use AKMA without interrupting other services, or 
vice versa.   
In order to avoid this showstopper against the scenario, we 
propose a solution. We have used the 3GPP studies that are 
considered for AKMA for our solution. The solution is 
developed according to the current technical requirements of 
eUICC and Multi SIM devices. We expect that our solution will 
provide secure and uninterrupted services for Multi SIM 
devices and devices with eUICC.  
 Development of 5G technology is expected to introduce 
new or improved services, e.g. AKMA with eUICC and Multi 
SIM devices. However, combination and co-existence of some 
of these new services could be problematic. We have identified 
one such problematic combination, which, nevertheless, could 
be widely useful. Then we developed a solution to the problem 
and showed that it requires no changes in existing standards. 
The AKMA standards would be impacted by our solution but 
these are still work-in-progress. 
Future work could include the implementation and 
standardization of our solution. In addition, new and better 
solutions could be developed for our problem, e.g. when eUICC 
specifications are developed further. Our solution could also be 
optimized further, especially in the case of Dual SIM Dual 
Standby. Another direction for further work is the setting where 
potentially several eUICCs and several physical UICCs co-exist 
in the same high-end device. 
APPENDIX ± ACRONYMS 
3GPP: 3rd Generation Partnership Project 
AApF: AKMA Application Function 
AAuF: AKMA Authentication Function 
AKA: Authentication and Key Agreement 
AKAF: AKMA Anchor Function 
AKMA: Authentication and Key Management for 
Applications 
AUSF: Authentication Server Function 
DSDA: Dual SIM Dual Active 
DSDS: Dual SIM Dual Standby 
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DSSS: Dual SIM Single Standby 
ETSI: European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
eUICC: Embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card 
GBA: Generic Bootstrapping Architecture 
GSMA: GSM Association 
IoT: Internet of Things 
LTE: Long Term Evolution; the 4th generation of cellular 
network¶V standards 
ME: Mobile Equipment 
MNO: Mobile Network Operator 
RSP: Remote SIM Provisioning 
SIM: Subscriber Identity Module 
UE: User Equipment 
UICC: Universal Integrated Circuit Card 
USIM: Universal Subscriber Identity Module 
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